Sunday, November 28, 2010

Saudi Arabia's Needy and Winter--"Warmth": The National Winter Initiative دفء: المبادرة الوطنية للشتاء


As easy as it is for Canadians--hunched over, head down, walking through snow and snowstorms for multiple months per year, wearing their winter uniform of winter clothes + heavy winter coat + boots + hat, scarf, and mitts or gloves, as they scurry from one overheated indoor setting to another--to dismiss the notion of winter elsewhere, all countries have a winter, even if it is a relatively balmy, but very rainy one.

Desert countries often have surprisingly low temperatures, especially at night, in winter, at altitude, and with the wind chill factor. Saudi Arabia is no exception; also, Saudi does have an impoverished sector of society--both Saudi, and overstayers from haj and umrah.

Even knowing this, I originally misunderstood the title of this initiative as some sort of "Save Saudi Students from Canada's Winter" Initiative. Given my current preoccupations, and the fact that yesterday I spent the day being surprised by a snowstorm, then reorganizing my day plans around beating it from city to city until I was home safe and warm, this is understandable.

However, "Warmth": The National Winter Initiative is a much broader, and more national effort. I was impressed on reading the Facebook site, that they have all bases covered:

Vision:
To Provide a Warm Winter to the Less-Privileged Factions of Society
الرؤية:
تأمين شتاء دافئ للشرائح الأكثر حاجة في المجتمع.


Mission:
To collect various types of resources to guarantee a warm winter for the less fortunate members of our nation.

الرسالة:
جمع وتوفير جميع المصادر التي سوف توفر الدفء للشريحة التي لا تستطيع توفير وسائل الدفء في شتاء المملكة القارص.


Resources collected will include but not be restricted to the following:
1- Human Resources (Volunteer work)
2- Medical Resources (Critical Care)
3- Financial Resources (Cash Donations)
4- Livability Resources (Clothes and Food)
5- Technical Resources (Heating Appliances and Electronic Supplies)
جمع الموارد المختلفة التي تشمل ولكن لا تقتصر على مايلي:
1. موارد بشرية (عمل تطوعي)
2. موارد طبية (رعاية الحالات الحرجة)
3. موارد ماليه ( تبرعات)
4. موارد احتياجات العيش (ملابس، طعام)
5. موارد تقنية ( أجهزة التدفئة الإلكترونية وما شابه)


Background:
The National Winter Initiative "Warmth" started as a discussion on how harshly cold the winter has become in the late years with death cases in 2009-2010 widely documented in both print and televised media. Thus several individuals, volunteer groups, foundations, corporations, and universities decided to take a stand and create some positive societal change by pooling resources to deal with this challenge.

The current target for the initiative is to focus on 3 main areas, namely Riyadh, Jeddah and the Eastern Province with potential to expand to the Northern and Southern regions of Saudi Arabia, and the rest of the Gulf.

لمحة عن المبادرة:
"دفء": المبادرة الوطنية للشتاء بدأت كنقاش عن شدة البرد في المملكة والذي أصبح أشد قسوة في السنوات الأخيرة مع حالات الوفاة التي حدثت في عامي 2009-2010 موثقه في الصحف والإعلام المرئي. لذلك قرر العديد من الأفراد، ومجموعات المبادرات والمتطوعين، المؤسسات الخيرية، الشركات، والجامعات لخلق بعض التغيير الإيجابي في المجتمع عن طريق تجميع الموارد المختلفة للتعامل مع هذا التحدي.

الهدف الرئيسي من هذه المبادرة هو التركيز على ثلاث مناطق وهي الرياض، جدة والمنطقة الشرقية مع احتمال التوسع للمنطقة الشمالية والجنوبية في المملكة بعد توفيق الله تم توفير الموارد، وبعد ذلك في بقية الخليج إن أمكن.

Current Initiative Supporters:
1- The Saudi Debate Society (SDS)
2- Net Impact Saudi Arabia (NISA)
3- Young Initiative Group (YIG)
الجهات المساندة للمبادرة:
1. مجموعة الحوار والنقاش السعودي .
2. مجموعة "تأثير" لخدمة المجتمع
3. مجموعة المبادرات الشابة


"Warmth": The National Winter Initiative Partners

The partnering groups are inspiring as well, and it is worth investigating their own websites:



While I have been provided for, or able to provide from myself, I certainly know what it feels like to be caught without proper winter clothing when there is a sudden weather change, and to be surprised by winters in supposedly warm climates. While milder than Canadian winters, they still require proper shelter, heating, clothing, food, and medical intervention. Ironically, the only time in my life that I have had bronchitis was living in the South of France, where I had underestimated winter clothing needs. The only time I have worn plastic bags as liners in my shoes was as a tourist at Christmas in Italy, again underestimating the potential for snow, or cold rain, even as far south as Rome.

The "Warmth": National Winter Initiative for KSA seems like a worthy charity for the generosity of all, and the volunteer efforts of all Saudi students and citizens, as well as perhaps particularly for women, Saudi and expat, with time and energy to donate to a meaningful activity.

The "Warmth": The National Winter Initiative began today--may it have a great success!

Snow covers Al Baha city south-western the Capital Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Tuesday, May 12, 2009. Torrential rains poured down on Al-Baha accompanied by gusty wind and snow capping the mountains and covering the valley areas and the forests of Al-Zaraeb and Khayrah. (AP Photo/Hassan Ammar)

Your worst winter experience?
Your worst winter experience in Saudi Arabia?
Efforts during winter in your area to help the less fortunate?
Other comments, thoughts, impressions, experiences?

For other photos see:
Snow in Deserts Of Saudi Arabia
Snow Storm in Tabuk

Friday, November 26, 2010

Black Friday! Thanksgiving and Commerce!


A unique feature of American, as opposed to Canadian, Thanksgiving is Black Friday. The 4th Friday in November, which is part of Thanksgiving Weekend, follows the main celebration on the official Thanksgiving Day, and is a tradition of major price reductions, shopping, predicting Christmas sales, and gauging the economic climate of the US.


(AP / Jeff Chiu)      

People line up for hours, or days even, to take advantage of sales on all items, whether to feather their nest, amuse themselves, or get a jump on Christmas shopping. Crowds are such that there have been injurious stampedes, and generally one should be prepared for sharp elbows, aggressive product selection, hoarding of items in all sizes and colours, and disputes over priority.

Black Friday has given rise to Cyber Monday,
for those shoppers who don't want to face the crowds,
or didn't find what they wanted on Black Friday Weekend.

Canadians plan trips to the US for cross-border shopping on Black Friday. Because of customs allowances, and the requirement to be absent at least a 24 hours from Canada--and for higher allowances at least 72 hours--such trips are often a weekend event, involving time off from work. Our Thanksgiving is on the second Monday in October, followed by...a normal Tuesday workday, and a more pronounced focus on the next event in the celebration calendar, Hallowe'en.  However, by the time Black Friday rolls around, the weather and marketing strategies have put us in the mood to prepare for Christmas and shop, too. Hence, off we go across the border for the sales, the outlet malls, the hotel packages.


Crossing from the Province of Ontario, Canada to the USA on Black Friday

Canadians cross-border shop so avidly that during the recession of the early 90's they kept north eastern US border towns and whole states from an economic downturn. Some even have post office boxes across the border to have US items shipped here and avoid the shipping fee (though not taxes and customs duty). Some shop ahead online as well, and have the goods sent to their hotel in time for their arrival. If they don't have one, they may rent a van for the adventure, and to hold bigger items more easily.

The arrival of Santa Claus at the end of the Thanksgiving Day Parade marks the start of the Christmas season, and the shopping frenzy that is Black Friday Weekend
--a tradition begun with store-sponsored parades, like that of Macy's in New York City above, 
which included advertisements along with the floats.

How do I, a reluctant shopper, know all this? Let's just say, I have friends and relatives who shall remain nameless! Also, anyone who has spent this much time as a student, recognizes a student boon wherever it may occur!

SHOP 'TIL YOU DROP!
GET THE BARGAINS!
STAY SAFE!

What are your Black Friday experiences?
Your best bargain ever?
Other comments, thoughts, impressions, bargain-hunting experiences?

Thursday, November 25, 2010

Happy American Thanksgiving November 25, 2010!


Happy Thanksgiving to Americans Celebrating Around the World!
And to All of Those Celebrating with Them!


A Belated Happy Canadian Thanksgiving! 
(October 11, 2010)

How will you be spending Thanksgiving this year?
What is your most memorable Thanksgiving?
What special traditions does your family have?
What regional menu do you follow for Thanksgiving?
What special dishes do you have as part of your tradition?
What religious aspects do you incorporate?
What is the farthest you have traveled to celebrate Thanksgiving?
Are you traveling this Thanksgiving?
Any scanner/pat down adventures?
Other comments, thoughts, experiences?

Monday, November 22, 2010

Who Killed Lebanon's Prime Minister Rafik Hariri [and Captain Wissam Eid]? A CBC Exclusive Documentary and Report

Who killed Rafik Hariri? His assassination in February 2005 rocked the power arrangements in the Middle East and turned him into an overarching symbol of everything that was wrong in Lebanon. (Mohamed Azakir/Reuters)

Canada's national broadcasting corporation, the CBC, well known for its news and documentaries, has produced a documentary of its own investigation into the killing of Lebanon's Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in Beirut on February 14, 2005. A suspiciously long investigation with few results until recently, and accusations against then Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, the CIA and Israel's Mossad, pro-Syrian Lebanese officials, and Hezbollah.

Evidence that Lebanese might be involved was de-stabilizing for Lebanon, where tensions are already high among factions that see Syria as a necessary protector against Israel, pro-Hezbollah elements, and their opponents. The USA is accused of plotting or helping Israel to plot the assassination to weaken Syria in preparation for an Iraq-style invasion, Syria being one of the list of 7 MENA countries on the George W Bush administration's list of places to effect regime change by invasion. The UN at one point contended that a "Hariri Network" of all of the above were involved. 4 pro-Syrian Lebanese Generals were arrested, and held without charge for years, but released when the UN found no evidence to convict them. Multiple investigations, reports, and ongoing assassinations and tensions complicate the story.

Lebanese Police Intelligence Captain, Wissam Eid, on his own time, discovered evidence of exactly how the massive bombing was orchestrated and gave information to the UN investigation. He was killed by a car bomb in January 2008. as were a number of planned witnesses at various times.

The CBC has exclusive documents which the UN has censored, making a formal request for their return to the CBC since learning of the documentary. A video introduction is available here. The full print report, excerpted below, is available here. The documentary originally aired on November 22, 2010 and is now available online: Getting Away with Murder: Part I; Part II. The full time is ~23 minutes. Shorter videos (~4 minutes) are available on the main site on Hariri. They include: UN and the Hariri Investigation;  Lebanon reacts to Hariri investigation.*


SPECIAL REPORT
Neil Macdonald
CBC Investigation: Who killed Lebanon's Rafik Hariri?

Last Updated: Sunday, November 21, 2010 | 10:54 PM ET
By Neil Macdonald CBC News

It wasn't until late 2007 that the awkwardly titled UN International Independent Investigation Commission actually got around to some serious investigating.

By then, nearly three years had passed since the spectacular public murder of Lebanon's former prime minister Rafik Hariri.

Hariri, the builder. The billionaire tycoon who'd reclaimed Beirut's architectural heritage from the shattered cityscape of a civil war and made it his mission to restore Lebanon's mercantile leadership.

Hariri, the nationalist who'd had the courage to stand against Syria, Lebanon's long-time occupier; and in his day was the most important reformer in the Middle East.

The massive detonation that killed him on Feb. 14, 2005 unleashed forces no one knew were there. All of Lebanon seemed to rise up in the murder's aftermath, furiously pointing at the country's Syrian overlords.

The not unreasonable assumption was that Hariri had died for opposing Damascus.

Lebanon's fury quickly accomplished what the assassinated leader had failed to achieve in his lifetime.

The murder gave rise to the so-called Cedar Revolution, a rare Lebanese political consensus. Syria, cowed by the collective anger, withdrew its troops.

At the UN, France and the U.S. pushed the Security Council into dispatching a special investigative commission.

For a time, it actually seemed that Lebanon was moving toward the rule of law and true democracy.

But, by the end of 2007, all that had ebbed. The killers remained uncaught. Syria was gradually reasserting its influence. And assassinations of other prominent Lebanese continued.

In the White House, senior administration officials began to conclude that the UN's famous clay feet were plodding toward nothing.

It turned out they were right.

A months-long CBC investigation, relying on interviews with multiple sources from inside the UN inquiry and some of the commission's own records, found examples of timidity, bureaucratic inertia and incompetence bordering on gross negligence.

Among other things, CBC News has learned that:

•Evidence gathered by Lebanese police and, much later, the UN, points overwhelmingly to the fact that the assassins were from Hezbollah, the militant Party of God that is largely sponsored by Syria and Iran. CBC News has obtained cellphone and other telecommunications evidence that is at the core of the case.
•UN investigators came to believe their inquiry was penetrated early by Hezbollah and that that the commission's lax security likely led to the murder of a young, dedicated Lebanese policeman who had largely cracked the case on his own and was co-operating with the international inquiry.
•UN commission insiders also suspected Hariri's own chief of protocol at the time, a man who now heads Lebanon's intelligence service, of colluding with Hezbollah. But those suspicions, laid out in an extensive internal memo, were not pursued, basically for diplomatic reasons.


Part I Connecting the Cell Phones

Detlev Mehlis, the German judge who was the UN commission's first chief investigator, holds up a photo in June 2005 of a white Mitsubishi truck, like the one that housed the 1,000 kg bomb that killed Hariri. (Jamal Saidi/Reuters)

In its first months, the UN inquiry had actually appeared promising. The first commissioner, a German judge named Detlev Mehlis, quickly delivered a blistering report suggesting Syria had ordered, if not actually carried out, the hit.

Unspecified agents, Mehlis contended, had done the deed.

But Mehlis's successor, a Belgian prosecutor named Serge Brammertz, seemed to be more interested in avoiding controversy than in pursuing any sort of serious investigation, at least according to people who worked for him.

Under his leadership, the commission spent most of its time chasing what turned out to be false leads and disproving wild conspiracy theories.

That isn't to say the commission didn't have some good investigators. It did. In fact, it had a handful of the best that Western police agencies had to offer.

But Brammertz could not be persuaded to authorize the one technique that those investigators wanted above all to deploy: telecommunications analysis, probably the single most important intelligence-gathering tool in modern times.

Telecommunications analysts use powerful computers and highly sophisticated software to sift through millions of phone calls, seeking patterns, referencing and cross-referencing, identifying networks and associations.

Police forces call it "telecomms." Spy agencies call it "sigint." It leads to convictions in courts and missile strikes in places like Afghanistan and Yemen.

Unbelievably, though, the UN commission in Lebanon did no telecom analysis at all for most of its first three years of existence. It wasn't until Brammertz was nearing the end of his term that one particularly dogged detective prodded him into letting the inquiry start examining phone records.

The breakthrough

At that point, in October of 2007, things began moving fast. Commission staff actually managed to obtain the records of every single phone call made in Lebanon the year of Hariri's murder — a stunning amount of data — and brought in a British firm called FTS to carry out the specialized analysis.

UN clerks worked day and night inputting data into a program called IBase. Then, in December, a specialist from FTS began examining what the computer was spitting out.

Within two days, he called the UN investigators together. He had identified a small network of mobile phones, eight in all, that had been shadowing Hariri in the weeks prior to his death.

It was the single biggest breakthrough the commission had accomplished since its formation — "earth-shattering," in the words of one of the people in the room the day the network was identified.

What the British analyst showed them was nothing less than the hit squad that had carried out the murder, or at least the phones they'd been carrying at the time.

For the first time, commission investigators were staring at their quarry. The trouble was, the traces were now nearly three years old, long past the "golden hour" for harvesting the best clues.

Still, it was something. And when the investigators began their due diligence, double-checking their work, there was another revelation, this one even more earth-shattering.

Someone digging though the commission's records turned up a report from a mid-ranking Lebanese policeman that had been sent over to the UN offices nearly a year and a half earlier, in the first months of 2006.

Not only had the policeman identified what the UN would eventually dub the "red network" — the hit team — he had discovered much more. He had found the networks behind the networks.

In fact, he'd uncovered a complex, disciplined plot that had been at least a year in the planning, and he had already questioned suspects.

What's more, everything he'd discovered pointed to one culprit: Hezbollah, the Party of God.

All of this was in the policeman's report, which he had dutifully sent to the UN officials with whom he was supposed to be partnering.

And the UN commission had promptly lost it.

Follow the networks. Investigators created a chart that showed the ever expanding connections between the suspected hit team and other cellphone carriers.



Part II Death of a True Patriot

Lebanese policemen break down at the funeral of Capt. Wissam Eid, 31, one of the country's top terrorism investigators. Eid was killed by a car bomb on Jan. 25, 2008, along with his bodyguard and three others, shortly after agreeing to help UN investigators. (Hussein Malla/Associated Press)

Before his violent death in 2008, Wissam Eid was an unusual figure in the murky, often corrupt world of Arab policing.

He had never actually wanted to be a policeman, or an intelligence officer. In authoritarian Arab society, he had no interest in becoming an authority figure. And yet, he'd had no choice.

Lebanese policemen break down at the funeral of Capt. Wissam Eid, 31, one of the country's top terrorism investigators. Eid was killed by a car bomb on Jan. 25, 2008, along with his bodyguard and three others, shortly after agreeing to help UN investigators. (Hussein Malla/Associated Press)
When he was doing his military service in the 1990s, the ISF, Lebanon's all-encompassing security force, noticed Eid's degree in computer engineering.

The security service was then trying to build an information technology department. And that was that.

"He was a patriot," says his father Mahmoud, sitting in the living room of the family home in Deir Ammar, on the outskirts of Tripoli.

The centerpiece of the room is, in the Arab way, a shrine to their son. The young man's intense, chiselled countenance stares back at visitors over commendations and testimonials.

His mother Samira, a picture of Islamic dignity, is a religious person. It helps with the grief.

The rest of her family is not particularly observant. But they all understand the savage realities of their country and how those realities clashed with Eid's unyielding pursuit of some of the most dangerous people in the world.

By the time Hariri was killed in 2005, Eid was a captain in the ISF. His boss, Lt.-Col. Samer Shehadeh, brought him into the investigation.

It was a Lebanese investigation, Eid was told, but it was also a UN one. Eid was to co-operate with the foreigners working out of the old abandoned hotel in the hills above Beirut.

Process of elimination

Capt. Eid, though, wasn't interested in delving into some of the wilder theories making the rounds in Lebanon.

He reasoned that finding the first traces of the killers was a process of elimination.

From Lebanon's phone companies, he obtained the call records of all the cellphones that had registered with the cell towers in the immediate vicinity of the Hotel St. George, where the massive blast had torn a deep crater.

Once Eid had those records, he began thinning out the hundreds of phones in the area that morning, subtracting those held by each of the 22 dead, then those in Hariri's entourage, then those of people nearby who had been interviewed and had alibis.

Soon enough, he had found the "red" phones the hit team had used.

But he didn't stop there. Exhaustively tracking which towers the red phones had "shaken hands with" in the days before the assassination, and comparing those records to Hariri's schedule, he discovered that this network had been shadowing the former PM.

The red-phone carriers were clearly a disciplined group. They communicated with one another and almost never with an outside phone. And directly after the assassination, the red network went dead forever.

But Eid had found another connection. He eventually identified eight other phones that had for months simultaneously used the same cell towers as the red phones.

Signals intelligence professionals call these "co-location" phones.

What Capt. Eid had discovered was that everyone on the hit team had carried a second phone, and that the team members had used their second phones to communicate with a much larger support network that had been in existence for at least a year.

Eventually, the UN would label that group the "blue" network.

Capt. Eid, at work at his ISF office, from a videotape his brother made. A computer specialist, he had the kind of mind that could see intricate patterns. (Courtesy Eid family/CBC)

More networks

The blue network also exercised considerable discipline. It, too, remained a "closed" network. Not once did any blue-network member make the sort of slip that telecom sleuths look for.

But these people also carried co-location phones and Eid kept following the ever-widening trail of crumbs.

The big break came when the blue network was closed down and the phones were collected by a minor electronics specialist who worked for Hezbollah, Abd al Majid al Ghamloush.

Ghamloush was, in the words of one former UN investigator, "an idiot."

Given the job of collecting and disposing of the blue phones, he noticed some still had time remaining on them and used one to call his girlfriend, Sawan, in the process basically identifying himself to Capt. Eid. He might as well have written his name on a whiteboard and held it up outside ISF headquarters.

Ghamloush's stupidity eventually led Eid to a pair of brothers named Hussein and Mouin Khreis, both Hezbollah operatives. One of them had actually been at the site of the blast.

Capt. Eid kept going, identifying more and more phones directly or indirectly associated with the hit team. He found the core of a third network, a longer-term surveillance team that would eventually be dubbed the "yellows."

Eid's work would also lead to another discovery: Everything connected, however elliptically, to land lines inside Hezbollah's Great Prophet Hospital in South Beirut, a sector of the city entirely controlled by the Party of God.

It has long been said that the fundamentalist fighters operate a command centre in the hospital.

Eventually, telecom sleuths would identify another network of four so-called "pink phones" that had been communicating both with the hospital and, indirectly, with the other networks.

These phones turned out to be tremendously important. It turned out they had been issued by the Lebanese government itself and when the ministry of communications was queried about who they had been issued to, the answer came back in the form of a bland government record.

CBC has obtained a copy of this record provided to the commission. On it, someone has highlighted four entries in a long column of six-digit numbers. Beside the highlighted numbers, in Arabic, was the word "Hezbollah."

Hezbollah has several seats in the Lebanese legislature and at the time had been part of a governing coalition, hence the government-issued phones.

Finally, Eid was handed a clue from the best source possible: He was contacted by Hezbollah itself and told that some of the phones he was chasing were being used by Hezbollah agents conducting a counter-espionage operation against Israel's Mossad spy agency and that he needed to back off.

The warning could not have been more clear.

As though to underscore it, Eid's boss, Lt.-Col. Shehadeh, was targeted by bombers in September 2006. The blast killed four of his bodyguards and nearly killed Shehadeh, who was sent to Quebec for medical treatment and resettlement.

By that time, Capt. Eid had sent his report to the UN inquiry and moved on to another operation.

The Eid report was entered into the UN's database by someone who either didn't understand it or didn't care enough to bring it forward. It disappeared.

Lebanese officials inspect the aftermath of an attempt on the life of Lt.-Col. Samer Shedaheh, Eid's boss at the ISF. Shedaheh survived the car bomb attack, near Sidon, in September 2006 and was sent to Canada for treatment and resettlement. (Kamel Jabe/Reuters)

Mixed with shame

A year and a half later, in December 2007, when the Eid report finally resurfaced, the immediate reaction of the UN telecom team was embarrassment. And then suspicion.

Eid claimed to have performed his analysis using nothing but Excel spreadsheets and that, said the British specialist, was impossible.

No one, he declared, could accomplish such a thing without powerful computer assistance and the requisite training. No amateur, which is how the specialists regarded Eid, could possibly have waded through the millions of possible permutations posed by the phone records and extracted individual networks.

The car-bombing of Rafik Hariri in 2005 was by no means an isolated incident in Lebanon's troubled history. Since 1977, at least a dozen prominent political leaders have been assassinated, including president Bashir Gemayel in 1982 and prime minister Rashid Karami in 1987.

Gemayel's nephew, Pierre Gemayel, a leader in the Christian Phalangist party and the minister of industry at the time, was killed by a car bomb in November 2006, a year and half after Hariri and when Hezbollah was in the midst of quitting the pro-unity government in a protest against the UN special tribunal.

The most recent outbreak of large-scale sectarian violence was in January and February 2008 when armed militias, made up of those like the pro-government Sunni gunman pictured above, fought in the streets of Tripoli and other large centres.
This Capt. Eid must have had help, thought the telecom experts. Someone must have given him this information. Perhaps he was involved somehow?

By now it was January 2008. A new UN commissioner was in charge, a Canadian justice official named Daniel Bellemare. Investigators were finally beginning to believe they were getting somewhere.

A deputation of telecom experts was dispatched to meet Eid. They questioned him and returned convinced that, somehow, he had indeed identified the networks himself.

Eid appeared to be one of those people who could intuit mathematical patterns, the sort who thinks several moves ahead in chess. Even better, he was willing to help directly. He wanted Hariri's killers to face justice, Hezbollah's warning be damned.

It was an exciting prospect for the UN team. Here was an actual Lebanese investigator, with insights and contacts the UN foreigners could never match.

A week later, a larger UN team met with Capt. Eid and, again, all went well.

Then, the next day, Jan. 25, 2008, eight days after his first meeting with the UN investigators, Capt. Wissam Eid met precisely the same fate as Hariri. The bomb that ripped apart his four-wheel-drive vehicle also killed his bodyguard and three innocent bystanders.

Lebanon gave Eid a televised funeral and, at the UN inquiry, there was outrage as well. But mixed with shame.

Because there was no doubt in the mind of any member of the telecom team why Eid had died: Hezbollah, they deduced, had found out that Capt. Eid's report had been discovered, that he'd met with the UN investigators and that he had agreed to work with them.

Immediately, the telecom team had the records of the cell towers near the Eid blast site collected, reasoning the killers might once again have left digital footprints they could follow.

Not this time, though. There was nothing. This time the killers did what they should have been doing all along: They'd used radios, not cellphones. Radios don't leave a trace.

That left the UN team with the obvious problem. Their adversary obviously knew not only what the UN investigators were doing, but knew in considerable detail.

And the more the UN investigators thought about it, the more they focused on one man: Col. Wissam al Hassan, the new head of Lebanese intelligence.

Assassination central
The car-bombing of Rafik Hariri in 2005 was by no means an isolated incident in Lebanon's troubled history. Since 1977, at least a dozen prominent political leaders have been assassinated, including president Bashir Gemayel in 1982 and prime minister Rashid Karami in 1987.
Gemayel's nephew, Pierre Gemayel, a leader in the Christian Phalangist party and the minister of industry at the time, was shot and killed while driving in his car in November 2006, a year and half after Hariri and when Hezbollah was in the midst of quitting the pro-unity government in a protest against the UN special tribunal.
The most recent outbreak of large-scale sectarian violence was in January and February 2008 when armed militias, made up of those like the pro-government Sunni gunman pictured above, fought in the streets of Tripoli and other large centres.



Part III An Unexplained Alibi

Col. Wissam Hassan, the ISF intelligence chief who was Hariri's chief of protocol at the time of the bombing. (CBC)
UN investigators prepared a report on Col. Hassan in late 2008 that challenged his alibi and recommended that he be brought in for detailed questioning.

In the tradition of Middle Eastern intelligence chiefs, Col. Hassan is a puzzling, even feared figure in his own country.

He was on the UN radar from the beginning, for two reasons: He quickly became one of the inquiry's main liaisons with the ISF; plus he was in charge of Hariri's security at the time of the assassination.

Except he hadn't been in the convoy the day of the blast. And his alibi was flimsy, to put it mildly.

On July 9, 2005, Col. Hassan told UN investigators that he was enrolled in a computer course, Management Social et Humaine, at Lebanese University.

He said that on the day before the assassination, Feb. 13, he had received a call from his professor, Yahya Rabih, informing him he was required to sit for an exam the next day.

Twenty minutes later, he told investigators, Hariri had phoned, summoning him. Col. Hassan said he arrived at Hariri's residence at 9:30 that evening and obtained his boss's permission to attend the exam the next day.

He spent the entire next morning studying for the exam, he told the UN, and turned off his phone when he entered the university, which was at just about the time Hariri died.

"If I wasn't sitting for that exam," Hassan told investigators, "I would have been with Mr. Hariri" when he died.

A different story

But Hassan's phone records told another story entirely.

In fact, it was Col. Hassan who called the professor, not the other way around. And Hassan placed the call half an hour after he had met Hariri earlier in the evening.

The cell towers around Hassan's home also showed that the next day Col. Hassan spent the hours before Hariri's assassination, the time he was supposedly studying, on the phone.

He made 24 calls, an average of one every nine minutes.

What was also disturbing the UN investigators was that high security officials in Lebanon don't normally sit for exams.

"His alibi is weak and inconsistent," says a confidential UN report that labels Hassan a "possible suspect in the Hariri murder."

That report, obtained by CBC News, was prepared in late 2008 for Garry Loeppky, a former senior RCMP official who had taken over as the UN's chief investigator that summer.

Hassan's alibi, said the document, "does not appear to have been independently verified."

That hadn't been for lack of desire on the part of UN investigators. They'd wanted to check out Hassan's alibi, to "get in his face," in the words of one former detective, and pick apart his story.

At the very least, they wanted to contact Rabih, the professor.

But Brammertz, the second UN commissioner, flatly ruled that out. He considered Hassan too valuable a contact and any such investigation as too disruptive.

Exile without end
Lebanon's vicious sectarian strife since the end of the Second World War cannot be fully understood without reference to the influx of Palestinian refugees who flooded into the country following the creation of Israel in 1948 and the Arab-Israeli War in 1967.
Recently, the CBC's Nahlah Ayed and colleagues from Radio-Canada spent some considerable time in Lebanon documenting the history and plight of these refugees and what they represent for the future of the region.
Their stories can be read and viewed in our special report: Exile without end: Palestinians in Lebanon


'Might damage relations'

The confidential report concedes that investigating Hassan could have its drawbacks: "It may damage the commission's relations with the ISF, and if he was somehow involved in the Hariri murder, the network might resolve to eliminate him."

Nonetheless, the report states that Col. Hassan "is a key interlocutor for the commission. He is in a unique position to influence our investigation. As such, questions regarding his loyalty and intentions should be resolved.

"Therefore, it is recommended that WAH be investigated quietly."

But even that wasn't done. The UN commission's management ignored the recommendation.

Former UN investigators remain suspicious to this day of Hassan, who, they note, was eventually cut out of the inquiry's loop.

But Hassan did become Capt. Eid's boss after the Hariri assassination. He certainly would have known about the sudden interest in the Eid report, and the meetings.

"He was an unsavory character," a former senior UN official said. "I don't think he participated in the murder, but there's no way of telling what he knew."

"He rose, at the very least, to the level of a person of interest," said another.

Reached in Lebanon today, al Hassan repeatedly declined comment.

More calls

Though told to back off, UN investigators nevertheless had managed to collect Hassan's phone records for late 2004 and all of 2005.

In that time, he had 279 discussions with Hussein Khalil, the principal deputy of Hezbollah chieftain Hassan Nasrallah. Khalil in turn spoke 602 times to Wafik Safa, who is known in intelligence circles as the hard man who runs Hezbollah's internal security department.

No one asked Hassan about those calls, either.

Hassan, though, also has his defenders. He remains a close ally of Hariri's son Saad, the current Lebanese prime minister.

Also, former U.S. officials, some of whom were in the Oval Office when then president George W. Bush vented his frustration with the commission's apparent incompetence, maintain that Hassan is in fact a bitter enemy of Hezbollah, and casting suspicion on him merely plays into the group's hands.

That this particular UN memo about Hassan was ever written, says one former American security official, is evidence that the commission hadn't the slightest idea what it was doing.

Several former UN investigators, though, are unanimous. They believe Hezbollah infiltrated the commission and used Hassan in the process.

"He lied to us on the alibi," says one. "He should have died in the convoy. That's the question mark."

Hezbollah leader Sheikh Nasrallah (left) and his top aide, Hussein Khalil (second from left), present a gift rifle to the head of the Syrian intelligence service to Lebanon, Rustom Ghazali (far right) in April 2005, two months after the Hariri murder and only days before Syria would pull the last of its troops from Lebanon. Looking on is Gen. Fayed al-Haffar. According to UN investigators, Khalil and Col. Hassan exchanged numerous phone calls in 2004 and 2005. (Reuters photo)


Part IV Naming Names

Daniel Bellemare, the Canadian prosecutor who heads the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, attends its opening ceremony in The Hague in March 2009. (Michael Kooren/Reuters)
Will the Canadian get his man? The CBC's Nahlah Ayed interviewed Daniel Bellemare in March 2009. Her report can be read and viewed here
.

Nearly six years have now passed since Hariri's assassination. The UN mandate was eventually expanded to include nine untargeted public bombings and 11 targeted attacks and assassinations, including that of Capt. Eid.

Daniel Bellemare oversaw the commission's transformation into the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, residing in The Hague, and is now its chief prosecutor.

To date, the UN inquiry has reportedly spent in the range of $200 million and there has been talk for some time now that it is preparing to bring down indictments, possibly late this year or in early 2011.

The tribunal currently has an annual budget in excess of $40 million and more than 300 employees from 61 countries. It has a headquarters, a team of prosecutors, a defence office, judges, clerks, investigators and research staff, even access to detention facilities, but not a single accused.

Bellemare is singularly uncommunicative about whatever progress has been made, as was Brammertz. From time to time, Bellemare has assured the Lebanese media that justice is proceeding, must remain confidential and shouldn't be rushed.

Bellemare refused repeated requests to speak to CBC News about this report.

The commission's telecom team eventually produced a succession of sophisticated charts depicting the phone networks behind the Hariri killing. CBC News has obtained a fairly recent iteration.

In recent months, investigators even attached names to some of the red phones carried by the Hariri hit squad.

But the biggest problem, according to several sources, has been converting the telecommunications analysis into evidence that will stand up in a court of law.

That means someone has to find financial records, or witnesses or other evidence, to actually place the phones in the hands of the alleged perpetrators.

As of mid-2009, sources say, the commission had not done so.

"There was no [corroborating] evidence whatsoever," says one former insider. "And there was no hope of getting any evidence. Because who are you going to put on the ground in southern Beirut to go digging around? You can't put anyone on the ground. It's not possible."

What's more, the commission never used wiretaps, even after it identified certain phones in networks that hadn't gone dead.

In all likelihood, any formal request to the Lebanese authorities for a phone tap would have become known in short order to Hezbollah, given its connections. And Bellemare wouldn't allow his investigators to buy and use eavesdropping technology on their own.

He had, though, gone cap-in-hand to Washington, looking for help from its intelligence agencies. There, he met with Bush's national security adviser, Stephen Hadley, and with then secretary of state Condoleezza Rice.

But he was rebuffed. Bellemare had not been Washington's choice for the job and U.S. officials did not hold him in terribly high regard. They were aware he had been spending much of his time obsessing over the trappings of his UN offices, ordering in tailored clothes, boasting about his prosecutorial prowess and designing a personal coat of arms.

His underlings had watched, bemused, as he dispatched security staff to Beirut's more fashionable shopping districts to inquire about having the family crest embossed on pieces of jewelry.

"If I was given to conspiracy theories," said one of Bellemare's former officials, "I'd think he was deliberately put in there so as not to achieve anything."

Secret intercepts from intelligence agencies like the CIA or National Security Agency are not useable in a court such as the UN Special Tribunal. And, knowing of the leaks and other problems at the UN commission, no intelligence agency in the West was prepared to hand over such sensitive material.

When Hadley politely inquired as to what Bellemare would consider a success — indictments, actual arrests, declarations of official suspicions? — the Canadian waffled, unable or unwilling to provide a precise answer.

Meanwhile, back in Lebanon, Hezbollah had begun mounting a campaign to ensure that gathering supporting evidence would remain next to impossible.

As rumours began surfacing in the Lebanese press that the UN tribunal was getting close to issuing indictments, Nasrallah, the Hezbollah chief, began warning that he will simply not tolerate arrests of any of his people.

That's no idle threat. Nasrallah operates a private militia considerably more powerful than the Lebanese army. And he also demanded that the UN tribunal, which is partially funded by Lebanon, be dissolved.

In recent months, Nasrallah has taken to claiming that it was actually Israel that killed Hariri.

More than one former UN investigator believes that should the telecommunications evidence ever be put before the Lebanese public, Nasrallah will acknowledge that his operatives were on the street when Hariri died, but claim that they were there chasing Israeli assassins.

Nothing the UN has uncovered points remotely at Israel. Everything points at Hezbollah. But invoking Israel always gains traction in the Arab world.

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton meets with Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri (the son of Rafik) in April 2009, in advance of a critical election. Saad Hariri has retracted some of his earlier comments about Syrian involvement in his father's death but the West is still applying pressure. (Bilal Hussein/Associated Press)

Backing off

One formerly senior official with the commission says "considerable progress" was made during the most recent months of Bellemare's term in gathering evidence to support the telecommunications work. But, he concedes, the evidence is still largely circumstantial.

That may be all the excuse that Prime Minister Saad Hariri and his political allies need to let this commission die.

Saad Hariri and his supporters originally blamed Syria for the assassination. But they've been backpedaling in recent months. Hariri recently exonerated Syria, repudiating his own sworn statement to UN investigators in 2005.

He has also called for an investigation of Nasrallah's claims that Israel killed his father.

Detlev Mehlis, the first UN commissioner, told CBC News recently that it has always been obvious Syria ordered the Hariri hit. That it would use Hezbollah, its long-time proxy, he says, is only logical.

The elder Hariri, Mehlis noted, had pushed not just for a Syrian withdrawal but also for the disarming of Hezbollah's feared militia.

Scott Carpenter, a former Bush administration official dispatched by the White House to Lebanon in the wake of Hariri's death, also says the reality is obvious.

But, he adds: "Is Hezbollah going to get away with it? Yes. Fewer travesties will be greater, but I don't see where the international will is to take this on, and I certainly don't see, absent that international will, how the Lebanese people can take it on."

A martyr remembered

Capt. Eid, who was posthumously promoted to the rank of major, lies in a grave not far from the family home in Deir Ammar.

His picture is everywhere in the city, looking down upon streets, cafes and restaurants. He is uniformly described as a martyr to his country.

His family has precious little by which to remember him. A few photos, a scrapbook of news stories about his death, and a few minutes of amateur video.

Mohammed Eid says that by late 2007, his older brother had begun living in his office, convinced he probably didn't have much longer to live.

He asked Mohammed to make the video, which depicts him working at his desk in the ISF's Beirut headquarters. In it, he banters with people off-screen; it is unremarkable footage, but haunting to anyone who knows his story.

Eid's mother, Samira, says her son was a gift to their country and believes that, as a martyr, he remains with her eternally.

"If we have a few other Wissams in Lebanon, the country will be just fine," she says. Her husband just stares sadly into space.

She and her husband and their three surviving sons know almost certainly who killed Wissam.

But this is Lebanon, and they understand the consequences of talking about that.

"I cannot open my mouth," she says, "because we have other young men to protect."

Mohammed Eid says the family has even come to realize that Lebanon could pay a bloody price if his brother's murderers are ever charged. "C'est pas le moment," he says, in the family's second language.

But of his brother's investigative skill, the family has no doubt.

In 2009, before the UN inquiry packed up and left for The Hague, an Australian prosecutor named Raelene Sharp, who'd been working for the commission, paid the Eid family a surprise visit.

She wept, as she told them that without their son, the commission would be nowhere.

Capt. Wissam Eid with his mother, Samira, from a video his brother made when the two brothers sensed his days might be numbered. (CBC)

Your comments, thoughts, impressions?

*This post was updated to replace air times with online video links for Getting Away with Murder, and ancillary videos, on the "Who Killed Rafik Hariri?" Report page.

Sunday, November 21, 2010

Hajj 2010/1431


The Hajj experience is a remarkable one for those who participate, the full measure of which is difficult to capture. Photographs, like the ones in previous posts and those below, re-ordered geographically from the Foreign Policy photo-article, The World Comes to Mecca, give some idea of the experience.

For more personal expressions, I would highly recommend Fouad AlFarhan's photo-journal of his Hajj experience this year 1431 الحج; and, the "tweet-log" of an American Muslim performing Hajj for the first time, compiled and posted by Fayiz Melibary, "The Dentographer" on his blog This Life I Lead, Hajj in the Eyes of a Stranger".

Makkah

Preparing bottles of zamzam water (special water from the Zamzam Well created when Ibrahim's infant son Isma'il cried for water and kicked the ground with his heel, as his mother Hagar ran between the 2 hills of  Safa and Marwah searching for water; the well is now within the Grand Mosque, just east of the Kaaba which the house of worship Ibrahim re-built on the site of Adam's original

A Saudi security guard in front of a billboard in Makkah

Arriving in Makkah on the top of a bus

Friday jummah noon prayers at the Grand Mosque, praying in the shade of the minarets

Walking in a tunnel after noon prayers at the Grand Mosque

Evening prayers near the Grand Mosque

Night prayers at the Grand Mosque

After night prayers, the streets of Makkah

Mina Valley

Resting on the road to Mina

Resting and walking on the Makkah-Mina route

A man walking with his son (and son's stuffed toy) on the road between Mina and Makkah

The new light monorail train carrying pilgrims from Mecca to the holy sites of Mina, Arafat, and Muzdalifah

Makkah

Overlooking Makkah from Noor Mountain, the location of the Hiraa cave where the Prophet Mohammed regularly went to pray; and where, at the age of 40, he first received the message of Islam, and became its Messenger.

Related Posts:
Saudi Arabia and Hajj
Eid Al-Adha
Hajj and Eid Al-Adha 2009—The Unforeseen: A Deluge of Rain and Flooding
Hajj--Some Elements of a Pictorial History: 7th-19th Centuries; 1885 Photos
Hajj and Health: Saudi Religious and Medical Leadership Prevails Over Religious Misinformation About Polio Vaccination
The Transformational Experience of Hajj: 3 Rare Interviews with Malcolm X on Islam, Race, Miscegenation, and his Organization of Afro-American Unity (OAAU)

See Also:
Hajj 2010 The Big Picture

Art & Creativity, Technology, and Innovation Youth (15-24) Competition for All Saudis, and non-Saudi Residents موقع عربي للمنافسة



The Most Competitive Youth Competition (MYC) is a new competition that is currently reminding potential competitors of the event, the upcoming deadline of Dec 1, 2010, and that 8-10 of the winners, in addition to other awards and opportunities, will be invited to a British Museum-Offscreen Expedition.

Although  the deadline is soon, as one of my mentors would say, "Let's do it, we have days"; and another would say, "You always should have something ready for these kinds of opportunities. What do you have that's near completion and fits?"  A third mentor reminds of the obvious, "You can't get it if you don't submit for it"; and a fourth points out, "If you apply now, you will be a better candidate for next year's competition."

I would strongly encourage those who are eligible to give serious consideration to participating. The process of applying and fine tuning a project, and the mentoring provided are well worth while as a learning experience, if nothing else. More information follows below, and full information is available on the official website in English and Arabic.

Adhering closely to the requirements and judging criteria are key in this type of exercise. If there are aspects that you don't like, or you don't like structure, consider both of these issues as heuristic devices.


For the rest of us, I think it is interesting to be aware of this type of initiative, its aims, and components. I was impressed, though not surprised, at the professionalism, generosity, and complexity of the endeavour. Though obviously students with at least moderate means will be favoured, there have been efforts to provide free resources, and make the competition open to all who are either Saudi or non-Saudi residents of the Kingdom, regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, or nationality.


From the Most Competitive Youth (MYC) Website

The Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) in collaboration with strategic international global partners (Microsoft, Cisco & Edge of Arabia / Off screen) have developed an overall comprehensive methodology and criteria for the youth competition that embodies the qualities and attributes of the 21st Century skill sets necessary to develop innovative and creative entrepreneurial leaders, and encourage and recognize today’s most talented and competitive youth under the platform of the Global Competitiveness Forum.


OVERVIEW

Description
The Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA), Microsoft, Cisco and Edge of Arabia /Off screen have agreed to a strategic partnership designed to create a new competitive platform for developing, recognizing, and nurturing the most competitive youth in Saudi Arabia.
(The United Nations, for statistical purposes, defines ‘youth’, as those persons between the ages of 15 and 24 years.)

The Most Competitive Youth Awards is a strategic initiative that will engage youth in Saudi Arabia (Saudi nationals and Saudi residents) in applying 21st Century skill sets to improving their communities, inspiring creativity, promoting innovation, and bringing Saudi Arabia’s economy to the forefront of competitiveness.

Objective
The purpose of this project is to create, promote and launch a unique competition that challenges youth in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to demonstrate their global competitiveness by applying 21st Century Skills sets while encouraging and fostering creative and innovative pursuits.

How it Serves Competitiveness?
Talent has become an increasingly key strategic asset for both nations and corporations. Across the globe, developed and developing countries, are at the forefront of expanded investments in education and programs to augment and build up the capabilities of their youth.

More specifically, driven by the growing imperatives of entrepreneurship, innovation and competitiveness, as well as sustainability concerns, each of these countries has come to the realization that encouraging and developing young talent is both a national economic priority and technological necessity.


ELIGIBILITY

The Most Competitive Youth competition is a non-discriminatory, open competition for all Saudi nationals and non Saudi residents between the ages of 15-24. For Creativity, the age range will be 16-24 as of June 2011. (The United Nations, for statistical purposes, defines ‘youth’, as those persons between the ages of 15 and 24 years.)

Individuals and teams of youth are both invited to apply. However, the organizers of the Most Competitive Youth Competition have compiled the following set of eligibility rules to ensure compliance with the mission of the competition. All candidates are expected to satisfy the following rules for the overall MCY competition as well as the rules set out for each specific category:

1. The MCY is a competition for Saudi nationals and non Saudi residents.

2. If applicants choose to participate in the MCY as a team, participating teams must have at least half the team must be Saudi Nationals

3. The minimum size of a team is two participants

4. The maximum size of a team is eight participants – but the size varies within each category

5. The competition is for new, and unique ideas designed to fit the with MCY theme

6. Ideas or work previously presented in other competitions will not be accepted

7. All ideas and work submitted must be law-abiding and not conflicting with religious practices

8. Teams can be comprised of youth of different majors and levels

9. Use of any external assistance, i.e. companies, tutors, teachers, mentors, parents etc. is allowed as long as they provide only guidance or assistance. The work and ideas must be of the individual or the team


CRITERIA

The first level of evaluation is done on the basis of the five core competitiveness criteria:

1. Content: Clarity, quality, relevance, comprehensiveness and impact of content and structure

2. Creativity: Uniqueness of idea presented and aesthetic value of presented designs and ideas

3. Innovation & Entrepreneurial Spirit: Demonstration of significant individuality and initiative as well as risk taking and leadership capabilities

4. Presentation Skills: Successfully presents ideas in a variety of forms. Demonstrates passion and belief in their ideas.

5. Technological Savvy: Effectively uses technology to showcase innovative ideas, apply creativity and share information


The 3 Types of Competition

ART & CREATIVITY Sponsor Edge of Arabia
A) Artwork (for example, a painting, drawing, collage or digital artwork)
B) Film (for example a video diary, a documentary or animation)
C) Photography (or series of photographs)

TECHNOLOGY Sponsor Microsoft
KODU CATEGORY [Game Lab-free download]
The Kodu category is a skill competition designed to recognize students who demonstrate excellence in a diverse range of technical, creative and game play depth and design in the use of Kodu Games Lab.
SOCIAL WEB CATEGORY [Microsoft small business office-free download]
The Social Web category is a social impact competition designed to recognize students who use social web and various tools to build authentic content to create awareness among the public about social problems.

INNOVATION Sponsor Cisco
The project aims at creating a competition for the youth between the ages of 15 and 24
in Saudi Arabia to come up with innovative ideas and solutions to improve their communities.
Innovation is meant to generate new ideas to solve and existing problem or address new opportunity. Fresh approach to the problem or challenge should be present. [sic]
The idea should present a solution to a clearly defined social problem within the areas of schools, universities and communities.


FAQS

MYC is also available on Twitter, Facebook, and Youtube.


Your comments, thoughts, impressions?

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